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Franchising is a system of marketing and distribution where 
an independent businessperson, the franchisee, is granted the 
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right to market the goods and services of another, the 
franchisor.1 As a vehicle for entrepreneurship and investment, 
franchising allows for efficient expansion of good business 
practices, the development of intellectual property both 
domestically and internationally, and the promotion and growth 
of small businesses.2 Since the late 1950s, the franchising 
business format has rapidly expanded throughout the United 
States.3 Around the globe, the US concept of franchising is 
relatively new and has earned an increasing share of 
international commerce.4 Franchised businesses worldwide have 
steadily accrued hundreds of billions of dollars in annual 
sales5—a record of growth that is likely to continue. 
Numerous countries have responded to this rise in 
franchising by enacting franchise disclosure laws and, 
sometimes, franchise relationship laws as well. The franchise 
sector was first regulated in the 1970s in the United States and 
Canada.6 By 1990, they were joined by France and Mexico.7 As of 
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1.  Dean T. Fournaris, The Inadvertent Employer: Legal and Business Risks of 
Employment Determinations to Franchise Systems, 27 FRANCHISE L.J. 224, 224 (2008). 
2.  Elizabeth C. Spencer, Consequences of the Interaction of Standard Form and 
Relational Contracting in Franchising, 29 FRANCHISE L.J. 31, 31 (2009). 
3.  ELIZABETH CRAWFORD SPENCER, THE REGULATION OF FRANCHISING IN THE 
NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY 1 (2010). 
4.  See Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Encroachment, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 191, 196–97 & 
n.23 (2010) (detailing the numerous statistics indicating the phenomenal growth of 
franchising worldwide, be it throughout Europe as well as such diverse and important 
national economies as those of Australia, Brazil, China, India, and Japan). For analysis 
of franchising in the European Union, see Robert W. Emerson, Directing the Disjointed: 
A Call to Harmonize EU Franchise Law, 12 INT’L J. FRANCHISING LAW 41_(2014) (review 
of MARK ABELL, THE LAW AND REGULATION OF FRANCHISING IN THE EU (2013).)  
5.  Manitoba Law Reform Comm’n, Consultation Paper on Franchising Legislation, 8 
ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 181, 187 (2008) (reporting that, according to a study 
conducted in 2001, “more than 767,000 franchised businesses directly employ[ed] 9.8 
million people, with a payroll of $229 billion and an economic output of nearly $625 
billion” and that franchising in 2001 accounted for 11% of the private sector payroll 
and 9.5% of the private sector economic output - more than US$1.53 trillion). 
6.  See California Franchise Investment Law, Cal. Corp. Code §§ 31000-31516 
(West 2011) (adopted as 1970 Cal. Stat. 2645). Compare SPENCER, supra note 3, at 1 
(California franchise enactment), with Peter Macrae Dillon, Will Franchising Survive as a 
Business Model Under Canadian Laws and Regulations?, 26 FRANCHISE L.J. 32, 32 (2006) 
(discussing how Canada’s Alberta province was “on the heels of California” in adopting 
franchise legislation in 1971). 
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2000, thirteen countries had enacted franchise legislation, 
including Australia, Brazil, China, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Romania, and Spain.8 Currently, over thirty countries, 
representing about one-third of the nations where franchised 
businesses operate, have enacted franchise-specific regulation.9 
Increased international franchise activity coupled with a growing 
recognition that franchising has its own distinctive business 
model has led the move toward more regulation.10 However, 
despite the tremendous growth of international commerce and 
an increasingly global business climate for which uniform laws 
would be a true boon, there has been no franchise law 
equivalent to the Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods.11 Despite, for example, the creation of the 
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
(“UNIDROIT”) Model Franchise Disclosure Law in 2002,12 the 
laws vary from country to country.13 The Republic of South 
Africa is no exception. In comparing South Africa’s new 
franchising regulations against the regulations of older 
commercial regulations, this Article examines key features, such 
as cooling-off periods, the unconscionability doctrine, and 
penalties for violations, which together set the consumers’ rights 
orientation of the South African law far from that of other key 
countries. 
                                                                                                                                     
7.  See SPENCER, supra note 3, at 1; see also Am. Bar Ass’n, International Franchise 
Sales Laws xxv (Andrew P. Loewinger & Michael K. Lindsey eds., 2006). 
8.  See SPENCER, supra note 3, at 1; see also BUSINESS FRANCHISE GUIDE paras. 
7000–7256 (CCH, 2000); see also Disclosure Requirements in International Transactions, 
BUSINESS FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) Issue No. 226 (Sept. 9, 1998). 
9.  See SPENCER, supra note 3, at 1. 
10.  See id. at 2. 
11.  See generally United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG], available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/treaty.html. For a current list of the CISG’s 
eighty signatory nation-states, including most of the leading national economies, such 
as the United States, Japan, China, Germany, and France, see STATUS: UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS l, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.htm 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2014). 
12.  MODEL FRANCHISE DISCLOSURE LAW (UNIDROIT 2002), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/modellaws/2002franchise/main.htm. 
13.  See SPENCER, supra note 3, at 2. 
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I. FRANCHISING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
A. Generally 
In South Africa, franchising operations were traditionally 
found in the fast food or restaurant industries.14 However, with 
about 49 million citizens,15 South Africa has a franchise 
landscape replete with business opportunities for retailers, 
business-to-business services, and automotive franchises to 
expand.16 This trend toward increased franchising has allowed 
South Africa to emerge as a major franchising market. 
Currently, franchises are responsible for about 12% of the 
country’s gross domestic product.17 
In response to the growing economic influence of 
franchises, the South African government enacted the 
Consumer Protection Act (the “South Africa’s Act” or the 
“Act”) on April 24, 2009.18 The Act codifies franchise practices 
that have been advocated by the Franchise Association of South 
Africa since the early 1990s.19 Additionally, the Act expands 
certain provisions of the country’s Competition Act of 1998.20 
Upon first glance, it appears the law seeks to remedy two issues 
that primarily affect black South Africans: high illiteracy21 and 
                                                                                                                                     
14.  See South African Franchise Market, WHICHFRANCHISE.CO.ZA, http://
www.whichfranchise.co.za/article.cfm?articleID=613 (last visited Feb. 23, 2014). 
15.  The World Factbook (South Africa), CIA.GOV, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2014) (an estimated 
population of 48,601,098 as of July 2013). 
16.  See id. (noting that, as of 2010, there were about 550 franchised brands and 
nearly 30,000 individual franchised outlets in South Africa). 
17.  Id. 
18.  Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (S. Afr.). 
19.  Kendal Tyre, A New Legal Landscape for Franchising in South Africa, 
FRANCHISING BUS. & L. ALERT, Sept. 2009, at 3. 
20.  Id. 
21.  Before the end of apartheid, the official illiteracy rate for blacks in South 
Africa was thirty-three percent while other estimates placed it as high as fifty percent. 
During the same time period, the illiteracy rate for whites was only one percent. Quite 
notably, the black illiteracy rate is much higher in South Africa than in many, if not 
most, African countries. The pattern of illiteracy is also different. While in most 
countries older people are most likely to be illiterate, in South Africa almost thirty-five 
percent of teenagers were illiterate. See Lorraine Eide, Current Crisis Facing Children in 
South Africa and the Efforts to Overcome It, 34 HOW. L.J. 37, 39 (1991). 
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low business ownership.22 This shift toward more regulation in 
South Africa can be understood by examining the country’s 
history. 
B. History of 20th Century South Africa 
Originally colonized by the British as a strategically 
important international trade port, South Africa entered the 
20th century in the midst of armed conflict, racial segregation, 
and race discrimination.23 Following the Second Anglo-Boer 
War (1899–1902), which was incited by a battle between the 
British Empire and local Dutch farmers for control over South 
Africa’s natural resources and economy, the South African 
government initiated various segregationist and racially 
discriminatory policies.24 These policies, building upon the 
British and Dutch legacy of segregation within the South African 
colonies, were a response to increasing participation of black 
Africans in the country’s economic system and their demands 
for political rights.25 
After World War II, when the segregationist National Party 
defeated the moderate United Party in the 1948 elections and 
enacted its “apartheid” legislation,26 these policies became 
much more oppressive.27 Many black, Indian, and coloured28 
                                                                                                                                     
22.  Although whites represented no more than one-tenth of South Africa’s 
population, by some estimates, they owned ninety percent of the country’s wealth 
during apartheid. See Bob Drogin, Ending Apartheid at Work, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1995, 
at A1. In the later years of apartheid, South Africa had a population of nearly forty 
million. S. Afr. Inst. of Race Relations, Race Relations Survey 1989/90, at 35 (1990), 
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/33820505/SA-Inst-of-Race-Relations-Race-
Relations-Survey-1989-90. 
23.  See generally History, S. AFR. GOV’T INFO., http://www.info.gov.za/aboutsa/
history.htm (last modified July 15, 2013). 
24.  See id. 
25.  See id.; see also DAVID DOWNING, WITNESS TO HISTORY: APARTHEID IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 15 (2004). Specifically, supporters of the racially discriminatory laws were 
concerned that without such laws, the black Africans majority would overrun white 
South Africans and cause the country to lose its hard-fought national independence. 
The supporters also believed that the cheaper black African labor would threaten the 
employment opportunities of white workers and miners. 
26.  The word “apartheid” comes from the Dutch word for the quality of being 
“apart,” and it refers to the South African policy of racial segregation of white 
inhabitants from the rest of the population. 1 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 92 (Lesley Brown ed., 1993). 
27.  DOWNING, supra note 25, at 15. 
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people were removed from their homes and deprived of their 
rights to the land after the government classified specific areas 
of the country as “white.”29 In addition, under apartheid, 
members of those groups were arrested, prosecuted, repressed, 
and forced into poverty.30 During the 1970s, the apartheid 
government also began instituting population control laws.31 
Separate educational opportunities for blacks and whites 
were also a notable feature of apartheid. Under the so-called 
“Bantu educational scheme,”32 blacks were educated as semi-
literate manual laborers and domestic workers rather than 
                                                                                                                                     
28.  Under the South African apartheid regime’s rigid racial classification system, 
“coloured” persons were of mixed racial heritage. ROGER OMOND, THE APARTHEID 
HANDBOOK: A GUIDE TO SOUTH AFRICA’S EVERYDAY RACIAL POLICIES 11 (2d ed. 1985). 
29.  See DOWNING, supra note 25, at 15; see also Alois Mlambo, The Ambiguities of 
Independence, Zimbabwe 1980–1990, in UNFINISHED BUSINESS: THE LAND CRISIS IN 
SOUTHERN AFRICA 57, 64 (Margaret C. Lee & Karen Colvard eds., 2003) (describing 
how black populations were stripped of their rightfully owned land). 
30.  See DOWNING, supra note 25, at 15. Essentially, these apartheid laws 
institutionalized discrimination. For example, the Mixed Marriages Act of 1949, 
prohibited marriage between people of different races, and the Immorality Act of 1950 
forbade all sexual relations between whites and non-whites. See APARTHEID MUSEUM, 
UNDERSTANDING APARTHEID: LEARNER’S BOOK 45 (2006), available at http://
www.apartheidmuseum.org/sites/default/files/files/downloads/Learners%20book%
20Chapter3.pdf (describing various apartheid legislation). 
31.  See Rachel Rebouché, The Limits of Reproductive Rights in Improving Women’s 
Health, 63 ALA. L. REV. 1, 8 (2011) (discussing South Africa’s history of racially 
discriminatory reproductive rights). In particular, the government provided tax 
incentives to white women, encouraging them to have children and made public 
appeals to white families asking them to have “enough children to ensure [the 
country’s] continued existence as a Christian and Western country on the continent of 
Africa.” Jerome A. Singh et al., South Africa a Decade After Apartheid: Realizing Health 
Through Human Rights, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 355, 373 (2005) (citing a 
speech delivered by the apartheid government’s Minister of Bantu Administration and 
Development, M.C. Botha). In stark contrast, policies aimed at controlling the black 
population encouraged broad access to, and use of, contraceptives. Id. In some 
instances, for example, medical providers injected black women without their consent, 
with Depo-Provera, a contraceptive drug, at three times the recommended dosage. See 
Diane Cooper et al., Ten Years of Democracy in South Africa: Documenting Transformation in 
Reproductive Health Policy and Status, 12 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 70, 71 (2004) 
(describing the broad use of contraceptive injections on black, rural women and how 
such injections are less reversible than traditional birth control); see also Barbara 
Brown, Facing the ‘Black Peril’: The Politics of Population Control in South Africa, 13 J. S. 
AFR. STUD. 256, 267–68 (1987) (discussing the apartheid government’s family planning 
policies targeted at black South Africans). 
32.  See generally Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953 (S. Afr.) (allowing whites to go 
to “Model C” schools while blacks were required to attend schools that were lesser 
equipped, lesser resourced, and had a less advanced course curriculum). 
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attorneys or other professionals.33 Proponents of this scheme 
believed blacks had no place in South Africa outside of labor 
and sought to maintain blacks as an underclass.34 In black 
schools, teachers were less educated, had lower professional 
qualifications, and received less government expenditures per 
student compared to white schools.35 Consequently, blacks were 
not equipped with the educational tools necessary to compete at 
the university level.36 
By the 1980s, anti-apartheid sentiment grew within the 
country and internationally.37 In 1987, the United Nations and 
other organizations began issuing sanctions intended to cripple 
the country economically and culturally, affecting areas such as 
foreign trade and sports.38 Following the sanctions, many foreign 
franchisors began selling off their franchises at fire sale prices as 
part of a mass business exodus out of the country.39 Apartheid 
would not end until 1994 when black Africans gained a 63% 
majority in the South African National Assembly.40 Since 1994, 
the country has been rebuilding, focusing on job creation, 
reducing inequality, ending poverty, and producing overall 
                                                                                                                                     
33.  See id.; see also Lisa R. Pruitt, No Black Names on the Letterhead?: Efficient 
Discrimination and the South African Legal Profession, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 545, 563 (2002). 
34.  See KENNETH S. BROUN, BLACK LAWYERS, WHITE COURTS: THE SOUL OF 
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 50 (2000); see also Pruitt, supra note 33. 
35.  See Pruitt, supra note 33, at 563 & n.58; see also S. AFR. INST. OF RACE 
RELATIONS, RACE RELATIONS SURVEY 839, 841 (Carole Cooper et al. eds., 1989–1990) 
(describing the lower education requirements of teachers at black schools); id. at 839 
(discussing lower professional qualifications for teachers at black schools compared to 
white schools); id. at 795 (showing lower annual expenditures for black schools versus 
white schools). 
36.  See Pruitt, supra note 33. 
37.  It should be noted that as early as 1966 the United Nations condemned 
apartheid as a crime against humanity. See Winston P. Nagan, Economic Sanctions, U.S. 
Foreign Policy, International Law and the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 4 FLA. INT’L L.J. 85, 
133 (1988). 
38.  See DOWNING, supra note 25, at 15; see also U.N. Ctr. Against Apartheid, 
Resolutions on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa Adopted 
by the United Nations General Assembly in 1987: A Commentary, U.N. Doc. No. 4/88 
(Apr. 1988), available at http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/
AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.nuun1988_03. 
39.  See Helen Suzman, Transformation in South Africa: Cause and Effect, 32 STAN. J. 
INT’L L. 149, 156–57 (1996). Making the exit from South Africa even more dramatic 
was the rapid rise in franchised businesses in the rest of the world. See generally 
Emerson, supra note 4. 
40. See Suzman, supra note 39, at 154. Black Africans had, in fact, been a majority 
of the South African population for many decades. Id. 
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growth.41 One of the most significant challenges to the new 
South African government has been to determine how to help 
the black African population reclaim land stolen during the 
country’s colonization.42 Over the last decade, the country has 
further developed its mixed jurisdiction legal system, reflecting 
aspects of both the civil law and common law systems.43 
II. SOUTH AFRICA’S CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The historical backdrop of apartheid may explain the 
country’s move toward more regulation in the area of consumer 
protection. The overall goal of the Act is:  
[T]o promote a fair, accessible and sustainable marketplace 
for consumer products and services and for that purpose to 
establish national norms and standards relating to 
consumer protection, to provide for improved standards of 
consumer information, to prohibit certain unfair marketing 
and business practices, to promote responsible consumer 
behavior, to promote a consistent legislative and 
enforcement framework relating to consumer transactions 
and agreements, to establish the National Consumer 
Commission, to repeal [legislation created during 
apartheid], and to make consequential amendments to 
various other Acts.44  
The sweeping language of the Act indicates the government’s 
desire to remedy the sins of apartheid and any residual effects 
apartheid might have on current business practices within the 
country. 
A few provisions of the Act are notable. For purposes of the 
Act, franchisees are included within the definition of 
                                                                                                                                     
41. See Suzman supra note 39. By 1996, five hundred American companies had 
returned to South Africa, tripling the amount of American companies that had been in 
the country before the sanctions. Id. at 157. 
42. See Postscript to UNFINISHED BUSINESS: THE LAND CRISIS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, 
supra note 29, at 411. 
43. See François du Toit, Constitutionalism, Public Policy and Discriminatory 
Testamentary Bequests—A Good Fit Between Common Law and Civil Law in South Africa’s 
Mixed Jurisdiction?, 27 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 97, 109 (2012) (discussing the “hybrid” 
nature of South Africa’s legal system). 
44. Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (S. Afr.). 
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“consumers.”45 The language defines franchisees as consumers 
“in terms of a franchisee agreement.”46 Specifically, the 
definition refers to franchisees as consumers where there is 
“solicitation of offers to enter into a franchise agreement” and 
where a franchisor supplies “any goods or services to a 
franchisee in terms of a franchise agreement.”47 Thus, as 
consumers, franchisees are given a bundle of rights designed “to 
promote and advance the social and economic welfare of 
consumers in South Africa” including honest dealing, fair value, 
good quality, safety, privacy, choice, information, fair and 
responsible marketing, supplier accountability, and equality.48 
Moreover, the Act is applicable to all transactions for the supply 
or potential supply of goods or services, in the ordinary course 
of business,49 paid for with valuable consideration (i.e., cash or 
anything of value, whether intrinsic or extrinsic).50 
Under the Act, all agreements, including franchise 
agreements, must also be written in “plain language” such that a 
person “with average literacy skills and minimal experience as a 
consumer of the relevant goods or services” can understand it.51 
Furthermore, the Act allows the franchisee, without cost or 
penalty, to cancel a franchise agreement within ten days of 
signing the agreement.52 The Act also prohibits specific 
                                                                                                                                     
45. Id. § 1. The definition reads: 
“consumer”, in respect of any particular goods or services, means— 
(a) a person to whom those particular goods or services are marketed in 
the ordinary course of the supplier’s business; 
(b) a person who has entered into a transaction with a supplier in the 
ordinary course of the supplier’s business, unless the transaction is 
exempt from the application of this Act by section 5(2) or in terms of 
section 5(3); 
(c) if the context so requires or permits, a user of those particular goods 
or a recipient or beneficiary of those particular services, irrespective of 
whether that user, recipient or beneficiary was a party to a transaction 
concerning the supply of those particular goods or services; and 
(d) a franchisee in terms of a franchise agreement, to the extent 
applicable in terms of section 5(6)(b) to (e). 
46. Id. 
47. Id. § 5(6)(b), (e). 
48. Id. § 3(1); see also Tyre, supra note 19. 
49. Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 § 1 (S. Afr.) (defining “supply”). 
50. Id. (defining “consideration”). 
51. Id. § 22(2). 
52. See id. § 7(2). 
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“unconscionable conduct” against consumers, including 
“physical force . . . coercion, undue influence, pressure, 
duress or harassment, unfair tactics or any other similar 
conduct.”53 Finally, the Act provides for stiff penalties for 
violation of its provisions, including fines and imprisonment.54 
In light of these provisions and the history of the country, 
South Africa’s Act appears to be more favorable to consumers 
rather than businesses. A question remains, however, as to 
whether and how much this pro-consumer approach to 
regulation will affect businesses and future business growth 
within the country. A comparison to four distinct nations (the 
United States, France, Australia, and China) and their varying 
approaches to franchising and consumer protection laws, 
further illuminates this issue.55 
The United States Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) first 
promulgated the Franchise Disclosure Document in 1979, with 
                                                                                                                                     
53. Id. § 40(1). 
54. See id. § 111(1). 
55. The franchising and franchising regulations have had a broad impact on the 
economies of each of these four countries. For example, in the United States, franchise 
businesses contributed about 4.6% (US$454 billion) to the gross domestic product 
(“GDP”) of the United States, generated about US$769 billion in sales output, and 
created about 8.1 million jobs in the United States alone. Int’l Franchise Ass’n, 
Franchise Business Economic Outlook for 2013, at 1, 7 (2012), http://www.franchise.org/
uploadedFiles/Franchise_Business_Outlook_12-17-2012.pdf. Similarly, France is now 
the largest franchising market in Europe, with 929 grossing US$51.6 billion in sales 
annually. Iuliana Scărlătescu & Mihaela Mărăcine, The High Impact of Franchising on 
Economic Affairs in Some of the EU Members, ANNALS UNIV. ORADEA: ECON. SCI. (Jan. 
2009), available at http://steconomice.uoradea.ro/anale/volume/2009/v1-
international-relations-and-european-integration/39.pdf. In 2011, France had a total 
GDP of US$2.712 trillion. GLOBAL FINANCE, France, http://www.gfmag.com/gdp-data-
country-reports/272-france-gdp-country-report.html#axzz2LqRvnLcL (last visited Feb. 
24, 2014). China has undergone franchise regulation reforms for the last thirty years 
and currently the country has 4500 franchise systems spreading across seventy 
industries. Thomas Leclercq & Guillaume Smitsmans, Franchising in China: Overview 
and Opportunities, THIRD PLACE LTD. 1, 2 (2012), http://www.third-place.be/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/Franchising-in-China-Whitepaper-by-Third-Place-Franchise-
Consulting.pdf. From 2008 to 2010, China saw a 32% increase in total franchise systems 
available in the country. Id. In comparison, Australia has had franchise-specific 
regulation since 1998. See generally Trade Practices (Industry Codes—Franchising) 
Regulations 1998 (Cth), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2010C00457. 
Currently, the franchising sector contributes 15% (or US$127 billion) to the country’s 
total GDP. U.S. & FOREIGN COMMERCIAL SERVICE, DOING BUSINESS IN AUSTRALIA: 2011 
COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE FOR U.S. COMPANIES 9 (2011), available at http://
www.franchise.org/uploadedFiles/Franchise_Industry/International_Development/
Country_Profiles/Australia_Country%20Guide_2011.pdf. 
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major amendments again in 2007.56 Thus, the United States has 
a long tradition of franchise regulation, a situation recognized 
worldwide by legal commentators.57 In contrast, France, an 
older, civil law system, began franchise regulation with its Loi 
Doubin in 198958 and may suggest that South Africa’s laws should 
become more pro-business. China, as a growing world 
economy,59 recently created regulation in 2004 and 2007 that 
seems to favor the rights of franchisees.60 Lastly, Australia, an 
English speaking country, culturally similar to the United States, 
began its franchising regulation in 1998 with amendments in 
2001 and 2008.61 
Accordingly, comparative analysis of each country’s 
approach to franchise regulation will answer the question 
whether a pro-consumer approach to franchise regulation will 
harm business growth in South Africa. Moreover, this analysis 
will determine whether South Africa can serve as a model for 
franchise law reform in the United States. 
III. A COOLING-OFF PERIOD 
One key feature of the South African Act is that it allows the 
franchisee a cooling-off period. Under the Act, a franchisee may 
                                                                                                                                     
56. See generally Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning 
Franchising, 72 Fed. Reg. 15444 (Mar. 30, 2007) (later codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 436) 
(amending Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and 
Business Opportunity Ventures; Promulgation of Final Interpretive Guides, 44 Fed. 
Reg. 49966 (proposed Aug. 24, 1979) (later codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 436)). 
57. See Katharina Wurm, Franchising Legislation—A Global Overview, in 
INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 59, 70 (Marco Hero ed., 2010); 
see also Gerald C. Wells & Dennis E. Wieczorek, A Road Map to the New FTC Franchise 
Rules, 27 FRANCHISE L.J. 105, 105 (2007). 
58. CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. L330-3 (Fr.); see Wurm, supra note 57, at 
65. 
59. At the close of 2010, China had surpassed Japan as the world’s second largest 
economy. China Overtakes Japan as World’s Second-Biggest Economy, BBC NEWS, Feb. 14, 
2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12427321. The American research firm 
Frost & Sullivan predicts that China will overtake the United States as the world’s 
largest economy by 2025. China ‘To Be World’s Biggest Economy by 2025’, TELEGRAPH 
(U.K.) (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/china-business/9655058/
China-to-be-worlds-biggest-economy-by-2025.html. 
60. See Wurm, supra note 57, at 63–64. 
61. See id. at 59–60 (stating that Australia seeks to increase the openness, quality, 
and expediency of franchise disclosures with laws that favor both franchisees and 
consumers). 
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cancel a franchise agreement within the first ten business days of 
signing.62 This cancellation is without costs or penalties, but does 
require the franchisee to notify the franchisor in writing.63 The 
franchisee thus has an opportunity to change her mind and 
reevaluate whether she wants to commit her time, money, and 
resources to building a franchise. 
For the franchisor, on the other hand, the cooling-off 
period has drawbacks. First, the franchisor must wait and see 
whether the franchisee is going to commit to the agreement. 
The franchisor thus might have to forego other potential 
franchisees who would be willing to commit. Second, in 
providing the franchise agreement to the franchisee, the 
franchisor transfers any intellectual property and proprietary 
information the agreement might contain.64 A franchisor might 
be wary of giving a franchise agreement to a potential franchisee 
only to see the franchisee cancel the contract and walk away with 
the franchisor’s valuable information and know-how.65 Third, 
                                                                                                                                     
62. Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 § 7(2) (S. Afr.) (“A franchisee may 
cancel a franchise agreement without cost or penalty within 10 business days after 
signing such agreement, by giving written notice to the franchisor.”). 
63. Id. 
64. Press Release, Webber Wentzel, Consumer Protection Act Regulations an 
Urgent Wakeup Call for Franchisors (July 18, 2011), available at http://
www.webberwentzel.com/wwb/content/en/ww/ww-in-the-news?oid=31619&sn=Detail-
2011&pid=32749. 
65. See generally Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Savoir-Faire: Clueless in America 
(Feb. 18, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing potential 
issues with transferring know-how and trade secrets to franchisees in the United States 
and abroad). In South Africa, intellectual property protection can be traced back to the 
Patents, Designs, Trade Marks, and Copyright Act of 1916. See GEORGE M. SIYOKA ET 
AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN AFRICA: STATUS OF LAWS, RESEARCH, AND 
POLICY ANALYSIS IN GHANA, KENYA, NIGERIA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND UGANDA 20 (2006), 
available at http://www.acts.or.ke/dmdocuments/ecopolicy16.pdf. Under the current 
legal framework, intellectual property is placed into two categories: copyright and 
industrial property rights. See ETHÈL TELJEUR, THE EDGE INST., INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA: AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF POLICY AND IMPACT 6 
(2003), available at http://www.tips.org.za/files/Teljeur_IPRs_paper_2003.PDF. 
Copyrights, along with so-called “neighbouring” rights, cover: literary, musical, 
photographic, artistic and scientific works; map, technical drawings, and computer 
programs; and provide protection from piracy and copyright infringement. Id. at 6–7. 
In contrast, industrial intellectual property includes inventions, designs, trademarks, 
and service marks, commercial names, and designations. Id. at 7. Typically, industrial 
intellectual property rights are protected by patents, registered trademarks, registered 
industrial designs, and geographical indications. Id. One way for a franchisor to protect 
its intellectual property from theft by a would-be franchisee is to file for intellectual 
property protection in South Africa covering the trademark and licensing materials 
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franchisors must expend capital, such as overhead or 
preparation expenses, before awarding a new franchise.66 The 
specter of franchisee cancellation during the cooling-off period 
could discourage franchisors from making crucial investments in 
the prospective franchise early in the process and delay the 
initial starting of the business.67 Under the Act, franchisors have 
no remedy to recover losses sustained due to cancellation of the 
agreement by the franchisee—a result that may leave some 
franchisors questioning whether business in South Africa is 
worth the risk. Moreover, at a minimum, this provision may 
result in franchisors becoming less willing to compromise 
during franchise negotiations, which could be harmful to overall 
franchise investment in the country. The cancellation period 
could result in increased costs of franchising, with fewer 
franchises granted and some businesses finding other ways to 
operate without using franchising. 
By way of comparison, in the United States, the current 
FTC franchise disclosure rules do not provide for any cooling-off 
period after the franchise agreement is signed.68 The rules do, 
however, require franchisors to provide disclosure documents at 
least fourteen days before the prospective franchisee makes a 
payment to the franchisor or signs the franchise agreement.69 
Similarly, in the event the franchisor unilaterally makes material 
                                                                                                                                     
transmitted to the franchisee under the franchise agreement. See generally Natasha 
Odendaal, SA’s Intellectual Property Protection Ranks High Globally, POLITYORG.ZA (Oct. 1, 
2010), http://www.polity.org.za/article/sa-intellectual-property-protection-ranks-high-
globally-2010-10-01 (discussing South Africa’s intellectual property protection). Details 
of the intellectual property provided to the potential franchisee can be outlined in the 
franchise agreement and could be used as evidence in future infringement litigation. 
See Eugene Honey, Franchising, Licensing, Distribution, Agency Agreements: Consumer 
Protection Act Regulations at Last, POLITYORG.ZA (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.polity.
org.za/article/franchising-licensing-distribution-agency-agreements-consumer-
protection-act-regulations-at-last-2011-08-17 (discussing how the South African 
Consumer Protection Act allows a franchisor to place details on intellectual property in 
the franchise agreement itself). 
66. Lucinda Rhoodie & Belinda Scriba, Franchise Agreements and the Consumer 
Protection Act, POLITYORG.ZA (April 8, 2011), http://www.polity.org.za/article/
franchise-agreements-and-the-consumer-protection-act-2011-04-08. 
67. These risks could, of course, be included in the costs a franchisor passes on to 
a new franchisee. If the market permitted it, savvy franchisors would simply charge 
more money for their franchises so as to compensate for the potential loss of the 
franchise agreement and the loss of their intellectual property. 
68. See 16 C.F.R. § 436 (2012). 
69. § 436.2(a). 
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changes to the standard form disclosures, the franchisor must 
provide the amended disclosures to the franchisee at least seven 
days before the signing of the agreement.70 Under either 
scenario, a franchisee in the United States must be given a 
period of time before a franchise agreement can be signed and 
given the force of law. 
The lack of a cooling-off period does not appear to benefit 
or harm franchising in the United States. Although the 
comparative economic prosperity of the United States may 
appeal to foreign franchisors, the complexity of the United 
States’ legal system may be an ongoing issue. For any foreign 
franchisor entering the market there may be legal pitfalls, 
including FTC disclosure rules, Securities Exchange 
Commission filing requirements, tax regulations, intellectual 
property approvals, and so forth—all factors that may discourage 
expansion into the country.71 Thus, while other concerns might 
prevent a foreign franchisor from selling franchise agreements 
in the United States, the lack of a cooling-off period in 
franchise-specific regulations appears to be a neutral factor in 
American franchising.72 
From the other perspective—a common law country with a 
franchising cooling-off period—Australia may serve as a warning 
that the time period does little to affect the franchise parties. 
Under Australian trade practice regulations, a franchisee may 
terminate a franchise agreement, or an agreement to enter into 
a franchise contract, within seven days of entering such an 
agreement.73 Additionally, if the franchisee chooses to terminate 
the agreement, the franchisor must return all payments and 
                                                                                                                                     
70. § 436.2(b). 
71. See generally Erik Wulff, International Franchising: A Different Perspective from the 
United States, INT’L FRANCHISE ASS’N (Jan. 2009), http://www.franchise.org/franchise-
news-detail.aspx?id=44086. 
72. Similarly to the United States, France also does not require a cooling-off 
period after the franchise agreement is signed. Under the Loi Doubin, franchisors must 
disclose certain information to franchisees at least twenty days before either the 
franchisee signs the contract agreement, or before the franchisee pays the franchisor 
any precontractual sum. CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. L330-3 (Fr.). With the 
twenty day time frame, and the precontractual disclosures, prospective franchisees in 
France certainly have time to think about those disclosures, before they sign the 
contract or pay any money. 
73. Trade Practices (Industry Codes–Franchising) Regulations 1998 (Cth) pt 3 s 13(1) 
(Austl.). 
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valuable consideration given by the franchisee to the franchisor 
within fourteen days of termination.74 Unlike South Africa’s Act, 
a franchisor in Australia is entitled to deduct “reasonable 
expenses” from the amount returned to the franchisee provided 
that such expenses, and their method of calculation, have been 
set forth in the franchise agreement.75 
The effect of the seven day cooling-off period in Australia 
appears minimal. Australia has had franchise-specific regulation 
since 1998.76 Although there was a decline in franchising in the 
few years following adoption of franchise regulation, economic 
growth in Australia has been exceptional since.77 The trend of 
economic growth tracks the overall increase in franchising in 
the country since the 1970s.78 As such, foreign franchises are 
likely to continue thriving in the Australian market.79 It should 
be noted, however, that of the 960 franchises operating in 
Australia, ninety-three percent of those appear to be Australian-
based.80 
Finally, China, like South Africa and Australia, has a 
mandatory cooling-off period following the signing of the 
franchise agreement. According to China’s Commercial 
Franchise Registration Administrative Measures decreed by the 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”), franchisors must 
give the franchisee a mandatory cooling-off period following the 
                                                                                                                                     
74. Id. s 13(3). 
75. Id.  
76. Australia’s Franchising Code is more formally known as the Trade Practices 
(Industry Codes—Franchising) Regulations. For the full text of the regulations, see 
Trade Practices (Industry Codes–Franchising) Regulations 1998 (Cth) (Austl.), available at 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2010C00457. 
77. Penny Ward, Australia’s Evolving Franchising Laws: Help or Hindrance?, 




80. Id. One reason for this could be because of Australia’s geographic isolation 
and potential difficulties with supplying the country with particular goods or services. 
See generally André Sammartino, A Geographically Isolated Economy’s Experience of 
the International Expansion of Retailing (Nov. 2006) (unpublished working paper) 
(on file with the University of Melbourne Department of Management and Marketing) 
(discussing the difficulties of foreign retail franchises due to Australia’s geographic 
isolation and the rise of domestic Australian retail superstores). 
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signing of the franchisee agreement.81 During this cooling-off 
period, the franchisee must have the unilateral right to 
terminate the agreement within a certain time frame.82 
However, unlike South Africa’s Act, the length of the cooling-off 
period is set by the franchisor and franchisee.83 
Along with the cooling-off period, China requires 
franchisors to operate at least two stores anywhere in the world 
for at least one year before entering into a new franchise 
agreement with a prospective franchisee.84 This is commonly 
referred to as a “2+1” requirement. Under prior laws, 
international franchisors could only meet the “2+1” 
requirement by having two franchises that were within China’s 
borders for one year,85 regardless of whether the franchisor had 
franchises in other countries. These earlier laws brought 
franchise expansion in the country to a crawl.86 The current law, 
however, appears to relax these requirements.87 In addition, the 
                                                                                                                                     
81. Yanling Ren, China, in GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: FRANCHISE IN 32 
JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 28, 30 (Philip F. Zeidman ed., 2011), available at 
http://www.franchise.org/uploadedFiles/Franchise_Industry/F2011Chinachapter.pdf; 
see Phillip Zeidman & Tao Xu, The Principal Features of the Current Franchise Regulation—
The Franchisor Franchisee Relationship, in CORP. COUNS. GD. TO DOING BUS. IN CHINA 
VOL. 1 § 11:8 (3d ed. 2012). 
82. Ren, supra note 81; Zeidman & Xu, supra note 81. 
83. Ren, supra note 81; Zeidman & Xu, supra note 81. 
84. (中国商业特许经营管理条例) [Regulations for the Administration of 
Commercial Franchising Operations] (promulgated by the St. Council, Jan. 31, 2007, 
effective May 1, 2007) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., May 23, 2007, art. 7 (China), available at 
http://franchiseasia.blogspot.com/2007/05/regulations-for-administration-of.html. 
85. Philip F. Zeidman, China: 2010 and Beyond, FRANCHISING WORLD (Jan. 2010), 
http://www.franchise.org/Franchise-Industry-News-Detail.aspx?id=49348. 
86. See id. 
87. Chinese courts have been inconsistent in determining the effect of the “2+1” 
requirement on the validity of a franchise agreement. For example, one Chinese court 
found that a franchise agreement was null and void because the “2+1” requirement 
had not been met. See (刘永兴) [Wang Jin] v. (北京阳光瑞丽美容有限公司) [Beijing 
Sunlight Rulli Beauty Co. Ltd.], (Beijing Chaoyang Dist. Ct., Oct. 10, 2008). In contrast, 
the court in Yongxing found that a failure to comply with the “2+1” requirement does 
not make a franchise agreement null and void. (刘永兴) Liu Yongxing v. (天才猫 
(北京) 国际品牌管理顾问有限公司) [Talent Cat (Beijing) International Brand 
Management Consultants Co., Ltd.], (Beijing No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct., Apr. 10, 
2009). The court reasoned that the “2+1” requirement is administrative rather than 
mandatory in nature and, therefore, could not nullify or void an otherwise legal 
contract. Id. Some commentators believe that if the “2+1” requirement is 
“administrative” rather than mandatory—meaning that a violation would result only in 
administrative penalties rather than rendering the contract void—then such an 
approach would be beneficial to future franchise growth in China. See Paul Jones, 
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law seeks to protect franchisees by ensuring that franchisors 
have a “well-developed business format” and the necessary 
business resources to support new franchisees, including 
trademarks, logos, patents, and proprietary technology.88 
Currently, the requirements of the Chinese laws, including the 
cooling-off period, although pro-consumer (i.e., pro-
franchisee), do not appear to hinder franchise growth in China 
as the government moves more toward deregulation and the 
economy continues to expand.89 
Overall, the requirement of a compulsory cooling-off 
period may be harmful to foreign franchise expansion.90 In 
effect, the cooling-off period merely cools the growth of 
franchising. Two countries with the cooling-off law, China and 
Australia, both have increasing franchise growth.91 However, 
ninety-three percent of the franchise growth in Australia is by 
Australian-based franchisors, not foreign ones.92 In China, the 
franchisor and franchisee can agree to the cooling-off period.93 
Thus, the cooling-off period in China is dependent on the 
bargaining power of the parties, which, in most instances, will 
favor the franchisor.94 Any stifling effects from cooling-off 
periods have yet to be seen in China probably because 
franchisors can simply contract out of a long cooling-off period. 
                                                                                                                                     
Chinese Franchise Update: How Mandatory is the 2+1 Rule?, ICSME 1, 2 (July 14, 2009), 
http://www.icsme-china.com/upload/china_franchise_update_090714.pdf (discussing 
the predictions of Chinese leaders as to how the requirement could impact Chinese 
business growth). 
88. Ren, supra note 81, at 30. 
89. See generally Zeidman, supra note 85. 
90. See Introduction—China, BUS. FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) ¶ 7060 (2011) 
(discussing how China’s mandatory cooling-off period creates uncertainty for 
franchisors expanding in the country). See generally Caroline O. Shoenberger, Consumer 
Myths v. Legal Realities: How Can Businesses Cope?, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 189, 212–
16 (2004) (discussing the ineffectiveness of cooling-off periods in protecting consumers 
from fraud and unfair business tactics and how businesses must now adjust to 
untenable consumer expectations). 
91. See Zeidman, supra note 85; see also Ward, supra note 77. 
92. See Ward, supra note 77. 
93. Ren, supra note 81, at 33. 
94. See, e.g., Newark Motor Inn Corp. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 1143, 
1152 (D.N.J. 1979) (discussing the argument that despite the franchisee’s ability to 
accept or reject a franchise agreement, the uniformity of essential franchise terms 
ultimately favors the franchisor). 
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Accordingly, nothing in the other four nations’ experience 
indicates the need for or utility of a cooling-off time. The United 
States and France do not have such a law. Australia has a period, 
but its highly domestic franchise market may simply make 
franchise growth or decline too related to Australia’s special 
situation. The same may hold for China, where the period is not 
imposed by the state but only through agreement of the parties. 
A compulsory cooling-off period has the potential to be harmful 
to franchise growth in South Africa. 
IV. UNCONSCIONABLE FRANCHISE AGREEMENT CLAUSES 
A. South Africa’s Act 
Another key feature of South Africa’s Act is its prohibition 
against unconscionable conduct. The Act defines 
“unconscionable conduct” as the “use [of] physical force against 
a consumer, coercion, undue influence, pressure, duress, or 
harassment, unfair tactics or any other similar conduct”95 or 
conduct “otherwise unethical or improper to a degree that 
would shock the conscience of a reasonable person.”96 
Specifically, the Act refers to such unconscionable conduct:  
in connection with any— 
(a) marketing of any goods or services; 
(b) supply of goods or services to a consumer; 
(c) negotiation, conclusion, execution or enforcement of an 
agreement to supply any goods or services to a consumer; 
(d) demand for, or collection of, payment for goods or 
services by a consumer; 
(e) recovery of goods from a consumer.97 
For franchisees, this section offers a bundle of potential claims 
against franchisors. 
As stated above, franchisees are regarded as consumers 
under the Act.98 As consumers, franchisees may seek relief under 
                                                                                                                                     
95. Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 § 40(1) (S. Afr.). 
96. Id. § 1. 
97. Id. § 40(1)(a)–(e). 
98. See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text. 
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the Act for common law duress and undue influence.99 In South 
Africa, undue influence or duress will render a contract 
voidable.100 This is because, depending on the facts of each case, 
a person’s will may have been improperly persuaded or 
influenced to reach a particular decision.101 Similarly, if physical 
force is used against the franchisee, the franchise agreement will 
be void ab initio.102 Moreover, the rule applies to unethical 
conduct in, among other things, marketing, negotiation, 
execution, and enforcement of agreements, including franchise 
agreements.103 Some commentators believe that the wide 
breadth of the language within this section indicates that the 
framers sought to impose “good faith” in all business dealings 
covered under the Act.104 
For franchisors, on the other hand, the breadth of terms 
blurs the line between outright unconscionable conduct and 
simple hard bargaining. For example, terms such as “pressure” 
or “unfair tactics” will undoubtedly mean different things for 
different parties. The meaning may even vary from transaction 
to transaction. Thus, until the legislature provides more 
guidance, the meaning of a term will be up to a court’s 
discretion. What courts consider “unfair” might simply be hard 
bargaining or sound business practice to business owners. The 
vagueness of these terms could lead to inconsistent court 
rulings. These inconsistent rulings could then result in 
uncertainty in the judiciary and the business community 
regarding what conduct is actionable and what conduct is 
permissible. Considering the stiff civil penalties awaiting any 
unwary business that falls prey to the Act, it will be up to the 
                                                                                                                                     
99. See W. Jacobs et al., Fundamental Consumer Rights Under the Consumer Protection 
Act 68 of 2008: A Critical Overview and Analysis, POTCHEFSTROOM ELEC. L.J. 302, 346–47 
(2010), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2010/24.pdf. 
100. See id. at 347. 
101. See id. 
102. See id. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the Latin term “ab initio” means 
“from the beginning.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 5 (9th ed. 2009). Thus, under South 
African law, when physical force is used, no contract or agreement could have been 
formed. 
103. See Jacobs et al., supra note 99, at 347–48. 
104. Id. at 347. 
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South African consumer tribunals105 to construe the meaning of 
these terms in order to resolve any forthcoming litigation.106 
Fortunately, there are a few remedies to this situation. First, 
the South African Competition Commission could promulgate 
regulations that precisely define any ambiguous terms within the 
Act.107 Additionally, the South African Tribunals could look to 
South African case law and the legislative history of the Act for 
guidance in construing any of the Act’s ambiguous terms. Such 
an approach would give direction to franchisors and allow them 
to conform their business practices (especially their negotiation 
practices concerning prospective franchisees) to conduct that 
does not violate the Act. Unfortunately, franchisors should 
probably wait until the law is settled as to the meaning of these 
terms before doing business in South Africa. With either 
remedy, at least in the present, the Act might stifle franchise 
growth in South Africa. To gain insight into whether this result 
might occur, this Article will further analyze the regulatory 
schemes of other countries and compare them to South Africa’s 
regulatory scheme. 
B. United States 
In the United States, Section 45 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (“Section 45”) prohibits “unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”108 For purposes of 
this section, “unfair or deceptive practices” include such acts or 
practices that “cause or are likely to cause reasonably 
foreseeable injury in the United States; or involve material 
conduct occurring within the United States.”109 Section 45’s 
prohibition applies to all persons engaging in domestic or 
foreign commerce.110 This includes franchisors. Although the 
                                                                                                                                     
105. Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 § 75(1)(a)–(b) (S. Afr.). 
106. See infra Section V. 
107. See Competition Act 89 of 1998 § 21(4)(d) (S. Afr.) (granting the South 
African Competition Commission the authority to promulgate regulations concerning 
the definitions of regulatory terms that are related to the Commission’s job of 
regulating competition and curtailing anti-competitive practices in the South African 
economy). 
108. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). 
109. § 45(a)(4)(A)(i)–(ii). 
110. § 45(a)(2), (a)(4)(A). However, § 45 does not protect franchises located in 
foreign countries. See Nieman v. Dryclean U.S.A. Franchise Co., 178 F.3d 1126, 1129–31 
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Act does not use the term “unconscionable”111 as in South 
Africa’s Act, it does specifically describe an act or practice as 
unfair where it “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to 
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers 
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to 
consumers or to competition.”112 Furthermore, courts are 
empowered by Section 45 to consider public policy, as 
established by statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions, to 
determine whether an act or practice is unfair.113 
Section 45 does not appear to hinder franchise growth in 
the United States. One reason could be that the US Congress 
has not yet provided a private right of action for aggrieved 
franchisees who believe that franchisors have violated their 
rights.114 All redress must proceed through an enforcement 
action brought by the FTC under Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act,115 effectively restricting the number of claims 
that can be brought against franchisors. Moreover, it is unlikely 
that the FTC will promulgate more franchise-specific 
regulations. It took nearly thirty years to amend the initial FTC 
Rule (1978 to 2007), and further revision is certainly not yet on 
the horizon. Further undermining any new regulation may be 
the notion that prospective franchisees can avoid much 
potential harm by simply shopping among different franchisors 
                                                                                                                                     
(11th Cir. 1999) (ruling that the Federal Trade Commission Act does not apply to US 
citizens operating outside the territorial United States because the Act lacked express 
language to that effect). The Act will apply, however, to foreign franchises operating in 
the United States. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(4)(A). 
111. Traditionally, in American law, a contract is unconscionable in an action at 
law if it is “such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the 
one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other.” Hume v. United 
States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889); see Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Goodwill: “Take a Sad 
Song and Make It Better”, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 349, 400 (2013) (discussing 
unconscionability and equitable estoppel in franchising). The South African and 
American use of the term appears to be similar. 
112. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). 
113. Id. For discussion of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in 
the franchising context, see Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Interpretation: A Two-
Standard Approach, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 641; Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and the 
Parol Evidence Rule, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 659, 723 & n.298 (2013). 
114. See Joel R. Buckberg & Jillian M. Suwanski, Disclosure Law Violations: 
Understanding the Penalties, FRANCHISING WORLD (Aug. 2008), http:// 
www.franchise.org/Franchise-News-Detail.aspx?id=41926. 
115. See id.  Section 5 actions are discussed infra notes 166–170 and accompanying 
text.   
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for the most favorable terms and conditions.116 Prospective 
franchisees can also freely discuss the nature of the franchise 
system, business prospects, and what to expect when contracting 
with existing franchisees.117 Both alternatives enable a franchisee 
to avoid any potential unfairness by the franchisor, making more 
regulation unnecessary. 
C. France 
France is no different from South Africa or the United 
States in seeking to prohibit unconscionable conduct toward 
consumers. Because France is a civil law system, a few key 
principles apply to franchise agreements. First, France 
recognizes the freedom of contract. Under article 1134 of the 
French Civil Code, “agreements legally formed have the force of 
law over those who are the makers of them . . . [and] must be 
executed with good faith.”118 Good faith under French law 
requires honesty and fair dealing on the part of both parties.119 
Read in isolation, this article empowers parties to make whatever 
agreements they choose so long as the agreements are 
compatible with the law and done in good faith. 
French civil law also requires equality among the parties 
and valid consent to contract. Article 1108 of the Civil Code 
requires four conditions for an agreement to be valid: (1) the 
consent of the party binding himself; (2) his capacity to 
contract; (3) an object forming the subject matter of the 
agreement; and (4) a lawful cause for forming the agreement.120 
Article 1108 seeks to protect the individual bargaining positions 
                                                                                                                                     
116. See Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and 
Business Opportunities, 72 Fed. Reg. 15,444, 15,447 (Mar. 30, 2007) (to be codified at 
16 C.F.R. pts. 436 and 437). 
117. See id. 
118. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1134 (Fr.) (translation provided by author). 
119. Ejan Mackaay, Paper Prepared for the Symposium in Honour of Michael J. 
Trebilcock: The Economics of Civil Law Contract and of Good Faith 14 (OCT. 1–2, 
2009), available at http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/conferences2/Trebilcock09
_Mackaay.pdf. 
120. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1108 (Fr.). 
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of each party to the contract and to introduce an element of 
equality into the agreement to prevent unconscionability.121 
In addition, article 1109 of the Civil Code specifically 
delineates that no agreement can be formed where consent has 
been “given through mistake . . . exported through violence or 
surreptitiously obtained by fraud.”122 As in South Africa, a 
finding by a French court of fraud, duress, coercion, or undue 
influence can render a franchise agreement void. Despite these 
Civil Code requirements for franchise agreements, France 
remains the largest franchise market in Europe.123 
D. Australia 
Australia’s regulations also prohibit unconscionable 
conduct.124 Part 2-2, section 22(1) of Australia’s Competition 
and Consumer Act of 2010 (“CCA”), as amended by the 
Competition and Consumer Legislation Amendment Act of 
2011, states the following: 
(1) A person must not, in trade or commerce, in connection 
with: 
                                                                                                                                     
121. See A.H. Angelo & E.P. Ellinger, Unconscionable Contracts: A Comparative Study 
of the Approaches in England, France, Germany, and the United States, 14 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMP. L.J. 455, 473 (1992). 
122. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1109 (Fr.). 
123. France continues to lead Europe with US$51.6 billion in annual sales 
through franchised units in 2006, see Rose Marie Faria, France Serves as a Gateway to 
Europe, FRANCHISE WORLD (last visited Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.franchise.org/
franchise-news-detail.aspx?id=33190, and EU€47.9 billion in such sales as of 2010, see 
Les Chiffres-Clés en France, FÉDÉRATION FRANÇAISE DE LA FRANCHISE, http://
www.franchise-fff.com/comprendre-la-franchise/les-chiffres-cles/en-france.html (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2014). In terms of the number of franchisors, France leads all other 
European nations by far—1658 different franchisors as of 2012. See Les Chiffres-Clés á 
l’International, FEDERATION FRANÇAISE DE LA FRANCHISE, http://www.franchise-
fff.com/comprendre-la-franchise/les-chiffres-cles/a-linternational.html (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2014). See generally Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contracts and Territoriality: A 
French Comparison, 3 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 310 (2010) (discussing 
French franchising and law, with comparisons to American law). 
124. It is worth noting the general structure of Australia’s statutory prohibitions 
against unconscionable conduct. Section 22(1) sets out the general prohibition of 
unconscionable conduct in business transactions. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 
(Cth) pt 2-2 s 22(1) (Austl.). Section 22(2) describes the different factors that courts 
can consider when determining whether particular conduct by a seller is 
unconscionable. Id. s 22(2). Section 22(3) describes the different factors courts can 
consider when determining whether particular conduct by a buyer is unconscionable. 
Id. s 22(3). Sections 22(2) and 22(3) are otherwise identical. 
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(a) the supply or possible supply of goods or services to 
a person (other than a listed public company); or 
(b) the acquisition or possible acquisition of goods or 
services from a person (other than a listed public 
company); 
engage in conduct that is, in all the circumstances, 
unconscionable.”125 
Additionally, part 2-2, section 21(1) states, “a person must not, 
in trade or commerce, in connection with the supply or possible 
supply of goods or services to another person, engage in 
conduct that is, in all the circumstances, unconscionable.”126 
The CCA does not precisely define the meaning of 
“unconscionable.” Instead, it allows courts to consider a variety 
of factors in determining whether any particular conduct is 
unconscionable.127 For example, under section 22(2),128 a court 
can assess the relative bargaining positions of each party, 
whether the business consumer was required to comply with 
conditions that were not reasonably necessary for the protection 
of the legitimate interests of the supplier, and whether the 
business consumer could understand the documents provided 
by the corporation or person.129 In addition, the court can look 
to: whether any undue influence or pressure was exerted on, or 
any unfair tactics were used against, the business consumer; the 
                                                                                                                                     
125. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt 2-2 s 21(1) (Austl.); Competition 
and Consumer Legislation Amendment Act 2011 (Cth) sch 2 (Austl.).  It should be noted 
that a franchisor need not always be a corporation. See Trade Practices (Industry Codes—
Franchising) Regulations 1998 (Cth) pt 1 s 3 (Austl.) (defining “franchisor” to include “a 
person who grants a franchise” and “a person who otherwise participates in a franchise 
as a franchisor”). 
126. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt 2-2 s 21(1) (Austl.). The 
Australian Parliament appears to have intended section 21(1) to cover unconscionable 
conduct generally, while section 22(1) covers unconscionable conduct in business 
transactions. See id. (noting that the title of section 21 is “Unconscionable conduct” 
and the title of section 22 is “Unconscionable conduct in business transactions”). 
127. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt 2-2 s 22(2) (Austl.) (listing twelve 
different factors that courts may consider in determining whether a supplier’s conduct 
toward a business consumer was unconscionable). 
128. See supra note 126 (unconscionability in the Australian statutes). This section 
concerns unconscionability by the seller. Some provisions were amended in 2012 with 
the Statute Law Revision Act 2012 (Cth) (Austl.), but nothing affected unconscionability. 
See id. sch 1 pt 1 ss 31–36, available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2012
A00136/Html/Text#_Toc336340051. 
129. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt 2-2 s 22(2)(a)–(c) (Austl.). 
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amount that equivalent goods or services would have cost from a 
person other than the supplier; the extent to which the 
supplier’s conduct toward the business consumer was consistent 
with the supplier’s conduct toward similar business consumers 
in similar transactions; and what industry codes or standards 
applied to the transaction.130 
Furthermore, under section 22(3),131 courts can consider 
the extent to which the acquirer unreasonably failed to disclose 
to the small business supplier any conduct by the acquirer that 
might have affected the interests of the small business supplier132 
or posed risks to the business consumer that were unforeseeable 
to the small business supplier.133 Judges also can take into 
account the parties’ conduct in the context of any contract 
between the acquirer and the small business supplier for the 
acquisition of goods or services.134 Finally, they can consider 
whether the acquirer had a contractual right to unilaterally vary 
a term or condition of a contract between the acquirer and the 
small business supplier for the acquisition of goods or services,135 
and the extent which the parties acted in good faith.136 Thus, 
Australian courts have broad latitude in assessing all aspects of a 
contract or transaction to ensure fairness and prohibit 
unconscionable conduct on the part of the stronger party, 
which, at least in the franchise context, is most often the 
franchisor.137 The broad statutory latitude provided here is in 
stark contrast to that of South Africa’s unconscionability 
                                                                                                                                     
130. Id. s 22(2)(d)–(g). 
131. Section 22(3) concerns unconscionable conduct by the buyer. See supra note 
124. 
132. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt 2-2 s 22(3)(i)(i) (Austl.). 
133. Id. s 22(3)(i)(ii). 
134. See id. s 22(3)(j)(iii). 
135. Id. s 22(3)(k). 
136. Id. s 22(3)(l). Under Australian law, all parties to a business transaction have 
an implied duty of good faith. See Pac. Brands Sport & Leisure Pty Ltd. v. Underworks Pty 
Ltd. [2006] 149 FCR 395, ¶¶ 64–65 (Austl.) (describing the test for determining if a 
party breached the duty of good faith in terminating a franchise agreement). 
137. See Parliamentary Joint Comm. on Corps. & Fin. Servs., Opportunity Not 




inquiries/2008_10/franchising/report/report_pdf.ashx (discussing the bargaining 
power imbalance that tends to favor franchisors over franchisees). 
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provision, which provides little or no guidance on how courts 
should construe the meaning of “unconscionable conduct” 
under the Act.138 Unlike South Africa, Australia provides clarity 
for both domestic and foreign franchisors as to what conduct 
meets or violates the Act. 
Surely clarity in its unconscionability law benefits Australian 
business. According to the Franchise Council of Australia, a 
peak body in Australia that represents franchisors, franchisees, 
and service providers to the country’s US$131 billion franchise 
sector,139 “the current regulatory framework strikes a practical 
balance between the interests of all stakeholders.”140 The 
Council believes that any change to the current definition or 
interpretation of unconscionable conduct in Australia will 
adversely affect that balance.141 In addition, the Council found 
that more regulation would create unnecessary uncertainty and 
cost, and create a disincentive to invest in Australia.142 With the 
existence of protections for franchisees before entering the 
franchise agreement and during the course of the relationship, 
the Council feels that Australia already has “the most 
comprehensive franchising regulation in the world.”143 
                                                                                                                                     
138. See Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 § 40(1) (S. Afr.) (defining 
“unconscionable conduct” as the “use [of] physical force against a consumer, coercion, 
undue influence, pressure, duress or harassment, unfair tactics or any other similar 
conduct”); see also § 1 (further defining “unconscionable conduct” as conduct 
“otherwise unethical or improper to a degree that would shock the conscience of a 
reasonable person”). 
139. About Us, FRANCHISE COUNCIL AUSTL., http://www.franchise.org.au/about-
the-fca.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2014). 
140. Franchise Council of Austl., The Nature and Application of Unconscionable 
Conduct Regulation: Can Statutory Unconscionable Conduct Be Further Clarified in Practice? 
para. 3.1 (2009), available at http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/1707/PDF/
Franchise_Council_of_Australia.pdf. Prior to the adoption of the current framework, 
the Productivity Commission of Australia had found that more consumer protection 
was needed for franchisees. In particular, the Commission noted that “[u]nfair terms 
appear commonplace in standard form contracts,” and that such exploitative contracts 
would remain prevalent so long as no regulatory measures are introduced against 
them. Australian Gov’t Productivity Comm’n, Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy 
Framework 430 (2008), available at www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/
79172/consumer2.pdf. 
141. Franchise Council of Austl., supra note 140. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. § 3.1(3). 
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E. China 
In contrast, Chinese laws prohibiting unconscionable 
conduct are in their infancy. Article 4 of the Regulation on the 
Administration of Commercial Franchises states, “[t]he 
principles of free will, fairness, honesty and good faith shall be 
followed for engagement in franchise activities.”144 Similarly, 
Article 5 of the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China 
states that “when undertaking business operations, a company 
shall comply with the laws and administrative regulations, social 
morality and business morality. It shall act in good faith, accept 
the supervision of the government and the general public, and 
bear social responsibilities.”145 In addition, Article 6 of the 
Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China mandates that 
contracting parties “shall observe the principle of honesty and 
good faith in exercising their rights and performing their 
obligations.”146 Good faith, under Chinese law, implies that the 
parties to a transaction will be at arm’s length and will not 
engage in unconscionable conduct, fraud, misrepresentation, 
deceit, and other similar practices.147 Although implied under 
Chinese provisions requiring good faith, Chinese law does not 
explicitly prohibit unconscionable conduct.148 
Despite the relative infancy of franchising in China, there 
are over 4000 franchise systems with more than 330,000 
                                                                                                                                     
144. (中国商业特许经营管理条例) [Regulation on the Administration of 
Commercial Franchises] (promulgated by the St. Council, Jan. 31, 2007, effective May 
1, 2007) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., Feb. 6, 2006, art. 4 (China), available at 
http://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/en/b/2007-02-06/23214.shtml. 
145. (中华人民共和国公司法 (2005年修订) [The Company Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (Revised in 2005)] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S 
CONG. GAZ., Oct 27, 2005, at art. 5 (China) (emphasis added), available at 
http://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/en/b/2005-10-27/8385.shtml. 
146. (中华人民共和国合同法) [Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2009, effective 
Oct. 1, 1999) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ., Mar. 15, 1999, art. 6 
(China) (emphasis added), available at http://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/en/b/
1999-03-15/8371.shtml. 
147. See China Franchise Law, SIGNATURE FRANCHISING para. 21, http://
www.signaturefranchising.com/China%20Franchise%20Rules%20&%20Law.html (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2014). 
148. One explanation for this may be that franchising has been developing in 
China for only about ten years or so unlike other countries such as France and the 
United States. 
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franchised stores operating within the country.149 Moreover, as 
of July 2012, it is estimated that China had a population of over 
1.34 billion.150 Accordingly, it may be time for the Chinese 
government to promulgate more franchise-specific regulation 
similar to that of South Africa. Like South Africa, China has a 
rapidly transforming economy—far different from the 
established structures of the other three nations (Australia, 
France, and the United States)—as the social structure shifts 
quickly from rural to urban, from illiterate to educated and 
globally connected. China also is culturally diverse with at least 
twelve recognized ethnic groups and eleven languages spoken 
within the country.151 With such a large, diverse population and 
wide array of franchisors doing business in the country, more 
comprehensive franchise regulation may provide franchisors 
with greater certainty as to the legality of their business practices 
while giving franchisees more security when they make the 
decision to invest. The vagueness of China’s franchising laws, 
however, is not impairing its robust franchise market.152 If China 
serves as a model for franchise growth in South Africa, then 
                                                                                                                                     
149. RESEARCH IN CHINA, CHINA FRANCHISE MARKET REPORT, 2010, available at 
http://www.researchinchina.com/Htmls/Report/2011/6039.html#6d (last visited Feb. 
23, 2014). 
150. China Demographics Profile 2013, INDEX MUNDI, http://
www.indexmundi.com/china/demographics_profile.html [hereinafter China 
Demographics 2013] (last updated Feb. 21, 2013). The United States and South Africa, 
in comparison, have population sizes of only 317 million and 52 million, respectively. 
See U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/
main/www/popclock.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2014); South Africa: Fast Facts, 
SOUTHAFRICA.INFO (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.southafrica.info/about/facts.htm#.
UTOuVxx3aLo. 
151. See China Demographics 2013, supra note 150. Chinese ethnic groups include 
Han Chinese, Zhuang, Manchu, Hui, Miao, Uighur, Tujia, Yi, Mongol, Tibetan, Buyi, 
Dong, Yao, and Korean. Id. The languages spoken in China are Mandarin (Putonghua, 
based on the Beijing dialect), Yue (Cantonese), Wu (Shanghainese), Minbei (Fuzhou), 
Minnan (Hokkien-Taiwanese), Xiang, Gan, and Hakka dialects. Id. In South Africa, the 
races are divided into five categories: African, Coloured, White, Indian, and Asian. See 
South Africa: Fast Facts, supra note 150. Moreover, South Africa is a very multi-lingual 
country with eleven official languages. Id. These languages are Afrikaans, English, 
isiNdebele, isiXhosa, isiZulu, Sesotho sa Leboa, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, Tshivenda, 
and Xitsonga. Id. 
152. China’s franchise sector has expanded nearly 15% since 2008. THOMAS 
LECLERCQ & GUILLAUME SMITSMANS, THIRD PLACE LTD, FRANCHISING IN CHINA: 
OVERVIEW AND OPPORTUNITIES 2 (2012), available at http://www.third-place.be/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/Franchising-in-China-Whitepaper-by-Third-Place-Franchise-
Consulting.pdf. 
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vague unconscionability clauses are far from dispositive in 
predicting future growth in the country.   
F. Unconscionability as a Concept Encouraging Franchise Expansion 
Overall, unconscionability clauses do not appear to 
negatively affect franchise business growth. In all four 
countries—where the governments either prohibit 
“unconscionable” conduct outright or, in the alternative, 
prohibit unfair practices or tactics, require fairness between the 
parties, and imply good faith in all business dealings—
franchising continues to grow as a business model from year to 
year.153 Thus, unconscionability clauses, such as the one in South 
Africa and the other countries examined, may actually 
encourage franchise expansion. Franchisees and prospective 
franchisees may be more willing to invest their resources into a 
new business because they have more protections and recourse 
under the law.154 
                                                                                                                                     
153.  Between 2011 and 2013, 21,339 new franchise outlets were created in the 
United States, a two-year growth rate of nearly 3% . IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, FRANCHISE 
BUSINESS ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR 2014 1 (Jan. 8, 2014), available at 
http://www.franchise.org/industrysecondary.aspx?id=10152. In the United States, 
franchise businesses grew 1.4% in 2013, and are expected to grow an additional 1.7% in 
2014 Id. For 2013, the growth in number of franchised establishments and in franchise 
output (4.3%) both exceeded the overall results for industries in which franchisees are 
concentrated.  Id. France, in contrast, has seen average annual franchise growth of ten 
percent since 2000 and remains the largest franchise market in Europe. See supra note 
123. In Australia, franchisors can expect to see thirteen percent annual revenue growth 
each year. Built for Growth: Franchises Deliver Double Digit Growth Second Year Running, 
PWC AUSTRALIA (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.pwc.com.au/media-centre/2010/
franchising-indicator-sep10.htm. In comparison, Chinese franchises are expected to go 
from 400,000 to 800,000 by 2021, creating over 10 million jobs in the country. 
LECLERCQ & SMITSMANS, supra note 152, at 2. 
154. See Franchisor Group Opposes Making Australia Franchising Code Mandatory, 
Global Franchising Developments, BUS. FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) ¶ 7315, § 3.2.3 
(2009) (discussing how Australia’s unconscionability provisions encourage franchising 
because it requires franchisors to have better business practices and discourage 
oppressive conduct toward franchisees). 
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V. STEEP CIVIL PENALTIES 
A. South Africa 
One other prominent feature of South Africa’s Act is the 
penalties it imposes for violating it. Under the Act, South 
African Tribunals can impose an “administrative fine in respect 
of prohibited or required conduct.”155 An administrative fine 
imposed under the Act may not exceed the greater of “10 
per cent of the respondent’s annual turnover during the 
preceding financial year” or 1 million in South African rand.156 
The more problematic of the two alternatives is the steep 
civil penalty of ten percent of the violator’s annual turnover. For 
purposes of the Act, annual turnover is defined as “the total 
income of that [franchisor] during the immediately preceding 
year.”157 Consider, for example, what ten percent of McDonald’s 
total income would be.158 The penalty is potentially crippling to 
a franchisor, in part because the Act does not clearly define 
whether the ten percent annual turnover penalty refers to the 
                                                                                                                                     
155. Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 § 112(1) (S. Afr.). A right of action 
under the Act is provided to the following person: 
a) A person acting on his or her own behalf; 
b) an authorized person acting on behalf of another person who cannot act 
in his or her own name; 
c) a person acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of 
affected persons; 
d) a person acting in the public interest, with leave of the Tribunal or court, 
as the case may be; and 
e) an association acting in the interest of its members. 
Id. § 4(1). Moreover, the National Consumer Commission (the country’s “consumer 
watchdog”), the National Consumer Tribunal (serving as the regulatory body under 
the Act), the Ombudsman, alternative dispute resolution agents, as well as various 
consumer and civil courts, are all charged with enforcing the Act. C. Van Heerden & J. 
Barnard, Redress for Consumers in Terms of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008: A 
Comparative Discussion, 6 J. INT’L COM. L. & TECH. 131 (2011). The Act also provides for 
criminal penalties. Under the Act, a person convicted of violating the Act can be fined 
or imprisoned for a period not exceeding twelve months or both. Consumer Protection 
Act 68 of 2008 § 112(3) (S. Afr.). 
156. § 112(2). Converted to US dollars, this amount is about US$120,000. Currency 
Converter, XE, http://www.xe.com/ucc/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
157. Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 § 112(4) (S. Afr.). 
158. McDonald’s Corporation had over US$27 billion total revenue in 2011. 
MCDONALD’S CORP., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2012), available at 
http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/content/dam/AboutMcDonalds/Investors/
Investors%202012/2011%20Annual%20Report%20Final.pdf. 
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franchisor’s total sales globally or only the total sales in South 
Africa. By comparison, South Africa’s Competition Act states 
that “an administrative fine imposed in terms of subsection (1) 
may not exceed 10% of the firm’s annual turnover in the Republic 
and its exports from the Republic during the firm’s preceding 
financial year.”159 The logic of the South African Consumer 
Protection Act, therefore, can go either of two ways: (1) the 
Competition Act is a model, and one assumes that the 
Consumer Protection Act uses the same definition for annual 
turnover; or (2) because the South African legislature did not 
use the term “Republic” for the Consumer Protection Act, it 
presumably is referring to the total sales of the franchisor in 
South Africa and abroad. Until clarified by statutory 
amendment, regulation, or court decision, there is a distinct 
possibility that a penalty would use all sales worldwide as the 
baseline.160 
Fortunately for franchisors, the Act does provide some 
guidance to tribunals that are determining the appropriate 
amount of an administrative fine. While there remains the issue 
of precisely defining the preceding year’s turnover,161 the Act 
specifies that any tribunal determining an appropriate 
administrative fine must consider the following factors: 
(a) The nature, duration, gravity and extent of the 
contravention; 
(b) any loss or damage suffered as a result of the 
contravention; 
(c) the behaviour of the respondent; 
(d) the market circumstances in which the contravention 
took place; 
                                                                                                                                     
159. See Competition Act 89 of 1998 § 61(2) (S. Afr.) (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, the Competition Act makes it very clear annual turnover refers to total 
sales in South Africa. 
160. Interview with Candice Meyer, Partner, Webber Wentzel, in Cape Town, 
South Africa (May 9, 2012), 
161. Since sales and revenue fluctuate from year to year, perhaps a longer period 
than just the preceding year would be a better measure for penalties. At any rate, does 
the counting start from one year immediately prior to the violation (as perhaps the Act 
indicates when it refers to “the immediately preceding year,” Consumer Protection Act 
68 of 2008 § 112(4) (S. Afr.)), or does it measure it by fiscal years (as perhaps the 
Competition Act implies in the phrasing “the firm’s preceding financial year,” 
Competition Act 89 of 1998 § 61(2) (S. Afr.))? 
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(e) the level of profit derived from the contravention; 
(f) the degree to which the respondent has co-operated with 
the Commission and the Tribunal; and  
(g) whether the respondent has previously been found in 
contravention of this Act.162 
These factors, as written, can be mitigating factors or 
aggravating factors, and thus give tribunals guidance in 
determining the amount of any fine levied against a franchisor 
for violating the Act. Moreover, the penalties set forth under the 
Act are maximum penalties, not minimums. Fines in many cases 
will be significantly lower than ten percent of a franchisor’s total 
sales. It is likely that a ten percent of turnover fine would 
probably require extreme and egregious conduct in almost every 
one of these factors. Thus, franchisors will not be writing a blank 
check to the South African government merely by opening 
franchises in South Africa. Nevertheless, many commentators 
argue that the perceived and potential risk for non-compliance 
are too great and that franchisors would be well-advised to 
reevaluate their current policies and practices to ensure that 
they comport with all facets of the Act.163   
The Act also provides for vicarious liability of employers for 
their employees’ conduct. Thus, a tribunal could hold an 
employer jointly and severally liable for the acts of its 
employees.164 The effect of these laws on franchising and 
commerce in South Africa is yet to be seen,165 but it is worth 
noting that disgruntled or unscrupulous franchisees could use 
the Act as a bargaining weapon against franchisors. 
                                                                                                                                     
162. Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 § 112(3) (S. Afr.). 
163. See Candice Posthumus, The Consumer Protection Act—It Has Teeth, NORTEN 
ROSE FULBRIGHT (July 27, 2010), http://www.nortonrose.com/news/44319/the-
consumer-protection-act—it-has-teeth; see also Andrew Allison, The Consumer Protection 
Act: When and How Does It Apply, GOTTA QUIRK (Apr. 4, 2011), http://
www.gottaquirk.com/2011/04/04/the-consumer-protection-act-when-and-how-does-it-
apply. Alternatively, franchisors could simply not do business in South Africa given the 
level of uncertainty contained in the Act and the potential costs for violating the Act. 
164. See Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 § 113(1). The vicarious liability 
provisions apply to fines only, not imprisonment. § 113(2). 
165. See Allison, supra note 163. 
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B. United States 
Similarly to South Africa, franchise regulation in the United 
States also provides for civil penalties. Under Section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, the FTC “may commence a civil 
action to recover a civil penalty in a district court of the United 
States against any person, partnership, or corporation which 
violates any rule . . . respecting unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices . . . with actual knowledge or knowledge fairly 
implied on the basis of objective circumstances.”166 In such an 
action, the person, partnership, or corporation will be liable for 
a civil penalty “of not more than [US]$10,000 for each 
violation.”167 Where a violator has continued to fail to comply 
with a rule or continues to engage in unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices, in or affecting commerce, each day of such 
continuance is an additional violation for the purposes of the 
civil penalty.168 Courts do, however, have discretion in assessing 
penalties. The rule mandates that when determining the 
amount of the civil penalty, “the court shall take into account 
the degree of culpability, any history of prior such conduct, 
ability to pay, effect on ability to continue to do business, and 
such other matters as justice may require.”169 Moreover, the FTC 
“may compromise or settle any action for a civil penalty if such 
compromise or settlement is accompanied by a public statement 
of its reasons and is approved by the court.”170 
As stated above, Section 45 prohibits unfair and deceptive 
acts or practices that affect commerce.171 However, franchisees 
do not have a private right of action against franchisors who 
violate Section 45.172 All enforcement and redress must proceed 
through an enforcement proceeding brought by the FTC.173  
                                                                                                                                     
166. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A) (2012). 
167. Id. 
168. § 45(m)(1)(C). 
169. Id. 
170. § 45(m)(3). 
171. See § 45(m)(1)(A). 
172. See Michael G. Brennan & Philip F. Zeidman, United States, in GETTING THE 
DEAL THROUGH: FRANCHISE IN 32 JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE, supra note 81, at 199, 203 
(stating that FTC rules do not grant aggrieved franchisees the right to bring legal 
action against franchisors who violate FTC rules); see also 15 U.S.C. § 45. 
173. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A). The lack of a private right of action by 
aggrieved franchisees stands out all the more since federal courts interpreted the 
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Under Section 45, the FTC may bring civil actions and seek 
monetary penalties, customer redress, and injunctive relief,174 
such as cease and desist orders against violating franchisors.175 In 
addition, the FTC could seek contractual remedies, such as 
rescission, reformation, and other equitable relief.176 
Franchisees may also receive monetary refunds.177 Additionally, 
individual states can establish remedies for aggrieved 
franchisees. Franchise violation penalties can vary from state to 
state.178 Accordingly, some states, such as California, provide 
criminal penalties for violation of state franchising laws.179 
Enforcement of state franchise regulations is usually the duty of 
a state official, generally either the state attorney general or a 
specialized franchisor investigator.180 In some states, there is a 
                                                                                                                                     
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 as impliedly containing a private right of action. 
See, e.g., Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (“The Act 
does no more than forbid certain types of conduct, which it defines in general terms, in 
connection with the purchase of securities. It does not even provide in express terms 
for a remedy, although the existence of a remedy is implicit under general principles of 
the law.”). However, federal courts have consistently held that there is no such private 
right of action under § 45. Morrison v. Back Yard Burgers, Inc., 91 F.3d 1184 (8th Cir. 
1996); Layton v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 368 (D. Md. 1989); 
Freedman v. Meldy’s, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 658 (E.D. Pa. 1984). 
174. See § 45(l)–(m). 
175. Id. § 45(b). 
176. Id. § 45(l) (equitable relief). See generally Wagstaff v. Protective Apparel Corp. 
of America, 760 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that a distributorship agreement 
could be rescinded on the grounds of frustration of purpose, and state law did not 
preclude rescission of a contract); Wilson v. Zimmerman, 495 P.2d 713 (Or. 1972) 
(holding that a franchisee could rescind a franchise agreement if false representations 
which induced franchisee to enter into contract were material). 
177. Brennan & Zeidman, supra note 172, at 203. 
178. Under principles of federalism in the United States, individual states can 
always provide more protection than required under federal law but never less. See U.S. 
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (stating that federal laws “shall be the supreme Law of the Land” 
superseding any state laws that conflict with them); see also Gorrie v. Bowen, 809 F.2d 
508, 520 (8th Cir. 1987) (“The supremacy clause only operates . . . to the extent that 
there is a conflict between state law and a federal law or regulation.”). 
179. California, for example, has various franchise registration laws that provide 
for criminal penalties. See, e.g., People v. Gonda, 188 Cal. Rptr. 295, 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1982) (finding a “willful” violation of state franchising laws in a criminal prosecution, 
even where defendant’s counsel had assured defendant of compliance with various 
disclosure laws and defendant relied on such advice). 
180. See, e.g., People ex rel. Fahner v. Halzel, 449 N.E.2d 531 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) 
(observing that Illinois’ Franchise Disclosure Act vested enforcement duties in the 
Illinois Attorney General). 
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private right of action.181 Criminal penalties can range from 
fines to imprisonment,182 but in most states enforcement 
authorities do not seek criminal penalties for violations.183 
C. France 
In contrast to the United States, France offers its own set of 
civil and criminal penalties for franchise violations. Article 1 of 
the French Commercial Code’s Loi Doubin184 applies specifically 
to distribution contracts, including franchise agreements.185 
Under the statute and the related regulatory decree, franchisors 
must disclose certain information to franchisees before the 
parties enter into a franchising agreement.186 
An implementing decree concerning the Loi Doubin issued 
on April 4, 1991, guides franchisors in determining what they 
should include in their disclosures.187 Besides the numerous 
required items to disclose,188 the decree requires franchisors to 
provide the disclosures in a language understandable to the 
future franchisee (presumably French), and it must occur at 
                                                                                                                                     
181. See, e.g., Bonfield v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 867 (N.D. Ill. 
1989), overruled on other grounds by Lewis v. Hermann, 775 F. Supp. 1137, 1153 (N.D. Ill. 
1991). 
182. See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/25 (1988) (making it a class 2 felony to 
violate certain provisions of the Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
705/26 (2009) (establishing a private cause of action for aggrieved franchisees and 
establishing civil liability for franchisors who violate certain provisions of the Illinois 
Franchise Disclosure Act). 
183. Brennan & Zeidman, supra note 172, at 203. 
184. See CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. L330-3 (Fr.); supra text accompanying 
note 58. 
185. See CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. L330-3 (Fr.). 
186. Id. (the statute–Loi Doubin); CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. R330-1 (Fr.) 
(the regulatory decree). 
187. Décret 91-337 du 4 avril 1991 portant application de l’article 1er de la loi 89-
1008 [Decree 91-337 of April 4, 1991, implementing Law 89-1008] JOURNAL OFFICIEL 
DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Apr. 6, 1991, 
art. 1 (corrected 4 May 1991) (now in force per Décret 2009-557 du 19 mai 2009 relatif 
à la partie réglementaire du code de commerce [Decree No. 2009-557 of May 19, 2009 
on the Regulatory Part of the Commercial Code], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], May 20, 2009, art. 4). 
188. See CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. R330-1 (Fr.) (listing such items as the 
franchisor’s company name, location, activity, capital, managers, last two annual 
financial statements, trademark information, commercial premises, market prospects, 
other franchisees (up to 50), number of franchisees which left the network in the past 
year, reasons for such departures, and terms and conditions for renewal, cancellation, 
or assignment). 
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least twenty days before the parties execute the franchise 
agreement.189 Furthermore, the decree levies civil fines and 
penalties against franchisors who violate the disclosure 
requirements.190 The law is not entirely clear, inasmuch as 
French codified laws do not provide much guidance as to the 
amount of the fines and penalties, and the Loi Doubin only 
applies to franchised relationships in which the franchisee 
received exclusive or quasi-exclusive rights.191 However, courts 
have delineated what constitutes quasi-exclusivity (roughly, 
about eighty percent or more of a market).192 Failure to deliver 
proper disclosures is a quasi-criminal offense in France, and a 
franchisor thus violating the disclosure requirements could face 
government prosecution.193 
D. Australia 
Australian law also provides for steep civil fines and 
penalties. The Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (“ACCC”) is a governmental entity charged with 
administering and enforcing the CCA and the Franchising Code 
of Conduct.194 The ACCC relies upon complaints from persons 
who believe a franchisor has not followed the disclosure 
requirements.195 If, after investigating the complaint, the ACCC 
                                                                                                                                     
189. See id. 
190. Décret 91-337 du 4 avril 1991 portant application de l’article 1er de la loi 89-
1008 [Decree 91-337 of April 4, 1991, implementing Law 89-1008] JOURNAL OFFICIEL 
DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Apr. 6, 1991, 
art. 2 (corrected 4 May 1991) (now in force per Décret 2009-557 du 19 mai 2009 relatif 
à la partie réglementaire du code de commerce [Decree No. 2009-557 of May 19, 2009 
on the Regulatory Part of the Commercial Code], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], May 20, 2009, art. 4). 
191. See CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. L330-3 (Fr.). 
192. Christophe Héry, Pre-contractual Information Obligation in French Commercial 
Contracts, DISTRIBUTION L. COMM’N NEWSLETTER (Int’l Ass’n of Young Lawyers, 
Brussels, Belg.), July 2010, at 7. 
193. Id. (noting that a franchisor would face contract avoidance in civil matters 
and a EU€1500 fine in criminal actions). Failure to follow disclosure requirements is 
also a quasi-criminal offense in some United States jurisdictions, such as Florida. See, 
e.g., Fla. Stat. § 817.416(2) (2012). 
194. Franchising Code of Conduct, AUSTL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N, 
available at http://www.accc.gov.au/business/industry-codes/franchising-code-of-
conduct (last visited Feb. 23, 2014). 
195. John Sier & Phillip Colman, Australia, in GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: 
FRANCHISE IN 30 JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 5, 8 (Phillip F. Zeidman ed., 2012), 
available at http://www.franchise.org/uploadedFiles/F2012%20Australia.pdf. 
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finds that the franchisor breached the Franchising Code of 
Conduct, the ACCC can seek administrative resolutions, impose 
a fine, or instigate court proceedings.196 Additionally, in 2009 
the Ministers for Innovation, Industry, Science, and Research in 
Australia proposed measures to strengthen Australia’s 
Franchising Code of Conduct and provisions of the Trade 
Practices Act to protect franchisees from the anti-competitive 
and unfair practices of more powerful franchisors.197 These 
measures, implemented in 2010, empower the ACCC to warn 
the public about “rogue or unscrupulous” franchisors, conduct 
audits of non-complying franchisors, compel franchisors and 
franchisees to engage in proscribed dispute resolution 
procedures, and require franchisors to give six months notice to 
franchisees as to whether the franchisee will be allowed to 
renew.198 
Although the Franchising Code of Conduct does not 
provide for specific civil or criminal penalties, the ACCC can 
impose penalties under the CCA.199 Section 76 of the CCA 
(“Section 76”) allows the ACCC to impose “pecuniary penalties” 
on any person, including a corporation, who contravened or 
                                                                                                                                     
196. Id. (discussing a variety of remedies available to the Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission (“ACCC”)). However, unless the franchisee discovers the 
violation of the disclosure requirements within seven days of signing the franchise 
agreement, the franchisee does not have a right to terminate the franchise agreement. 
Id. 
197. Media Release, Craig Emerson, Austl. Gov’t Innovation Minister, 
Government to Strengthen Franchising Code of Conduct and Unconscionable 
Conduct Law 1 (Nov. 5, 2009) [hereinafter Media Release], available at 
http://www.franchise.org.au/files/4b8608511e5d6.pdf. It is possible that the Ministry 
may have been concerned about the remedies available to franchisees under the Trade 
Practices Act and thought more protections for franchisees were necessary. For 
example, under the Australian common law, a franchisor’s contravention of statutory 
provisions, like the Trade Practices Act, would only render a contract unenforceable 
and would not result in further penalties. See Ketchell v Master of Educ. Servs. Pty Ltd. 
(2007) 226 FLR 169, 175 (Austl.) (citing Trade Practices Comm’n v Milreis Pty Ltd. (1977) 
29 FLR. 144, 158 (Austl.)), overruled by Master Educ. Servs. Pty Ltd. v Ketchell (2008) 236 
CLR 101 (Austl.) (finding that a statutory contravention does not render a contract 
unenforceable). The holding of the High Court of Australia in Ketchell effectively gave 
franchisees less protections under the law and may have resulted in the proposed 
measures to strengthen Australia’s Franchising Code of Conduct and various provisions 
of the Trade Practices Act. 
198. See Media Release, supra note 197, at 1–4. 
199. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt VI s 76 (Austl.). 
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attempted to contravene, Part IV of the CCA.200 In addition, the 
ACCC can levy pecuniary penalties against any party that has 
aided, abetted, counseled, or procured a person to contravene 
Part IV, or induced, or attempted to induce, a person, whether 
by threats or promises or otherwise, to contravene Part IV, or 
has been in any way, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned 
in, or party to, the contravention by a person of Part IV, or has 
conspired with others to contravene Part IV.201 
 If a corporation, including a franchisor, violates any 
section of Part IV, that corporation, or “body corporate,” must 
pay the greatest of the following: 
(i) $10,000,000; 
(ii) if the Court can determine the total value of the benefits 
that have been obtained . . . by one or more persons that 
are reasonably attributable to the act or omission—3 times 
that total value; 
(iii) if the Court cannot determine the total value of those 
benefits—10% of the annual turnover . . . of the body 
corporate during the period (the turnover period) of 12 
months ending at the end of the month in which the act or 
omission occurred; and . . . 
(d) for each other act or omission to which this section 
applies—$10,000,000.202 
Section 76 provides courts with some guidance as to how to 
apply the provision presented above. For purposes of the 
provision, “annual turnover of a body corporate, during the 
turnover period is the sum of the values of all the supplies that 
[the corporation], and any [corporation] related to the 
[corporation], have made, or are likely to make during [a 12-
month period],” excluding certain taxes and supplies that are 
not connected with Australia.203 The CCA defines “supply” in 
                                                                                                                                     
200. Id. s 76(1)(a)(i). Part IV of the CCA is the Restricted Trade Practices 
provision. That provision includes section 22 discussed in Part IV.D. 
201. Id. s 76(1)(c)–(f). 
202. Id. s 76(1A) (emphasis added). 
203. Id. pt VI s 76(1B)(5). This is similar to the “annual turnover rate” as defined 
in South Africa’s law. See Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 § 112(4) (S. Afr.) 
(defining annual turnover as “the total income of that [franchisor] during the 
immediately preceding year”). The annual turnover rate of a noncompliant franchisor 
may not necessarily be an appropriate gauge to determine a pecuniary penalty—
perhaps because it is excessive or unreflective of the financial benefit a franchisor may 
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two ways. First, regarding goods, supply represents those goods 
provided “by way of sale, exchange, lease, hire or hire-
purchase”204 by the corporation. Regarding services, supply 
refers to those services “provide[d], grant[ed], or 
confer[red]”205 by the corporation. Accordingly, as in South 
Africa, Australian courts can impose a penalty equivalent to ten 
percent of a corporation’s overall sales, whether in goods or 
services or both, for a specific twelve-month period.206 
In deciding the penalty amount, an Australian court can 
order the violator to pay the country for each violation to which 
a given section applies.207 The court may also consider all 
relevant matters, including the nature and extent of the acts or 
omissions and of any loss or damage suffered as a result, the 
circumstances of such acts or omissions, and whether the 
violator has previously been found by the court, in prior 
proceedings, to have engaged in any similar conduct.208 Unlike 
in the United States, the CCA also provides a private right of 
action for aggrieved parties to recover losses or damages that 
result from a franchisor’s or other party’s contravention of the 
Act.209 
Australia also has a unique approach to criminal penalties. 
Unlike South Africa, the United States, China, and France, 
criminal proceedings may not be brought against any person for 
a violation of the CCA, including Part IV discussed above.210 
According to section 78, no criminal proceedings may lie against 
any person who contravenes the CCA, attempts to contravene 
                                                                                                                                     
have received from a single violation or set of violations. However, it may be that the 
legislature simply wanted noncompliant franchisors and the like to feel a punitive sting 
and to discourage potential criminal practices. See generally Gregory C. Shaffer & 
Nathaniel H. Nesbitt, Criminalizing Cartels: A Global Trend?, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 313, 321 
(2011) (describing increased competition and the prevention of cartels as the main 
reasons why many countries, including Australia, are moving toward enhanced 
sanctions). 
204. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt I s 4(1) (Austl.). 
205. Id. 
206. See supra text accompanying note 202. 
207. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt VI s 76 (Austl.) (“[T]he Court 
may order the person to pay to the Commonwealth such pecuniary penalty, in respect 
of each act or omission by the person to which this section applies . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
208. Id. 
209. See id. s 82(1). 
210. See id. s 78. 
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the CCA, aids, abets, counsels, or procures a person to 
contravene the CCA, induces, or attempted to induce, a person, 
whether by threats or promises or otherwise, to contravene the 
CCA, has been in any way, directly or indirectly, knowingly 
concerned in, or party to, the contravention by a person of the 
CCA, or has conspired with others to contravene the CCA.211 As 
such, violations of the CCA are not within the purview of 
Australia’s criminal laws. 
 
E. China 
Similar to the United States and France, Chinese law 
provides for stiff civil penalties and criminal liability. These 
penalties are contained under articles 24, 25, 27, and 28 of the 
Regulations on Administration of Commercial Franchise 
(“Franchising Regulations”). 
Article 24 of the Franchising Regulations governs penalties 
against franchisors who do not satisfy the “2+1” requirement 
under article 7. Under article 24, if a franchisor does not satisfy 
the “2+1” requirement,212 the Chinese commercial 
administrative department “shall order it to make a correction, 
confiscate its illegal proceeds, impose a fine of more than 
100,000 yuan but less than 500,000 yuan on it, and make an 
announcement about it.”213 Additionally, if an entity or 
individual who is not an “enterprise” engages in a franchise as a 
franchisor, the commercial administrative department shall 
order the offending person to stop the “illegal business 
operations, confiscate its or his illegal proceeds, and impose a 
fine of more than 100,000 yuan and less than 500,000 yuan.”214 
The regulations do not define the meaning of “illegal business 
operations,” but presumably the regulations are referring to the 
                                                                                                                                     
211. See id. s 78(a)–(f). 
212. See supra text accompanying notes 84–89. 
213. Shangye Texujingying Guanli Tiaoli (商业特许经营管理条例) [Regulation 
on the Administration of Commercial Franchises] (promulgated by the St. Council, 
Jan. 31, 2007, effective May 1, 2007) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., Feb. 6, 2007, art. 24 (China), 
available at http://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/en/b/2007-02-06/23214.shtml. 
500,000 Yuan is about US$82,000. XE Currency Converter, XE, http://www.xe.com/ucc 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
214. See Shangye Texujingying Guanli Tiaoli, supra note 213. 
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offending person’s operations in the scope of the illegally 
operated franchise. 
Article 25 governs penalties against franchisors that do not 
satisfy certain filing requirements.215 Under Article 25 of the 
Franchising Regulations, if a franchisor fails to make an archival 
filing after entering in a franchise agreement for the first time, 
the Chinese commercial administrative department must order 
the franchisor to make such a filing within a limited time period 
and the department must “impose a fine of more than 10,000 
yuan but less than 50,000 yuan.”216 If the franchisor again fails to 
make the appropriate filing, the department must impose 
another penalty of between 10,000 and 50,000 yuan, and it must 
make an announcement.217 
Article 27 governs penalties for franchisors that use 
fraudulent or misleading advertisements or promotions.218 
Article 27 authorizes a fine “of more than 30,000 yuan but less 
than 100,000 yuan” if a franchisor engages in fraudulent or 
misleading advertising or promoting.219 If the circumstances are 
serious, the commercial administrative department can impose a 
penalty of “more than 100,000 yuan but less than 300,000 yuan” 
along with a public announcement.220 The franchisor is also 
liable for the fraudulent or misleading advertising under 
Chinese advertising law.221 Article 27 also provides for criminal 
sanctions if the fraudulent or misleading nature of the 
                                                                                                                                     
215. Article 8 governs the filing requirements. Id. art. 8. Specifically, after a 
franchisor enters into a franchise agreement for the first time, the franchisor must file 
a photocopy of the business license or enterprise registration certificate, a sample 
franchise contract, a brochure for franchised operations, a market plan, a written 
commitment and relevant certification materials proving that the provisions in Article 7 
are followed, and any other documents or materials required by the State Council. Id. 
If the franchisor is operating in only one province, the archival filing will be with the 
commercial administrative department of that province. Id. If the franchise operates in 
multiple provinces, the archival filing must be with the State Council. Id. 
216. Id. art. 25. 
217. Id. 
218. See id. art. 27 (proscribing penalties for violations of Article 17 which 
prohibits franchisors from using fraudulent or misleading advertisements). 
219. Id. 
220. See id. 
221. Id. 
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advertising constitutes a criminal offense.222 However, Article 27 
does not describe the precise nature of the criminal sanctions.223 
Article 28 of the Franchising Regulations also provides for 
civil penalties if the franchisor does not disclose certain 
information.224 Under Article 28, a franchisor can be fined 
“more than 10,000 yuan but less than 50,000 yuan” for violating 
Chinese franchise disclosure laws.225 For more serious violations, 
the franchisor can be fined “more than 50,000 yuan but less 
                                                                                                                                     
222. Id. 
223. Also, where money or property is defrauded “in the name of franchise,” and 
it constitutes a criminal offense, it shall be investigated and penalized as such under 
Chinese criminal laws. Id. art. 29. 
224. Id. art. 28. Articles 21, 22, and 23 require certain disclosures by franchisors. 
Article 22 requires that the franchisor disclose to the franchisee the following: 
(1)  the name, domicile, legal representative, registered capital, business 
scope of and basic information about the franchised operations of the 
franchiser;  
(2)  the basic information about the registered trademark, enterprise mark, 
patent, know-how and business model of the franchiser;  
(3)  type, amount and payment method of franchising fees (including 
whether the guaranty bonds should be collected as well as the conditions and 
methods for guaranty bonds);  
(4)  prices and requirements for providing products, services and equipment 
to the franchisee;  
(5)  specific contents, methods and implementation plans for continuously 
providing business guidance, technical support, business training and other 
services to the franchisee;  
(6)  specific measures for guiding and supervising the business activities of 
the franchisee;  
(7)  the investment budget for the franchise outlet;  
(8) the quantity, distribution and business evaluation of current franchisees 
within the territory of China;  
(9)  digests of the financial statements and audit reports as audited by the 
accountant firm for the recent two years;  
(10) the conditions about franchise-related lawsuits and arbitration for the 
recent five years;  
(11) whether the franchiser or its legal representative has ever conducted 
major illegal business operations; and  
(12) other information prescribed by the commercial administrative 
department of the State Council. 
Id. art. 22. Article 21 requires that the franchisor disclose this information, along with 
the text of the franchise agreement, in writing, at least twenty days before the 
franchisee actually signs the franchise agreement. Id. art. 21. Article 23 generally 
requires that the franchisor’s disclosures be accurate, and it grants the franchisee the 
power to rescind the franchise agreement if the franchisor’s disclosures were 
inaccurate. See id. art. 23. 
225. Id. art 28. 
2014] FRANCHISEES AS CONSUMERS 497 
than 100,000 yuan” coupled with a public announcement of the 
fine.226 
CONCLUSION 
Franchising has historically been thought of as catering to 
mom-and-pop investors. Today, however, many franchisees are 
sophisticated, well informed, and experienced businesspersons 
who recognize the arm’s length nature of the business 
relationship between the franchisor and the franchisee and, 
therefore, seek to protect themselves. Nonetheless, numerous 
other franchisees do not come to the business world with those 
advantages of knowledge, skills, and practice.227 Certainly, this 
dearth of qualifications must be at least as likely for prospective 
franchisees in the developing world. 
The foregoing analysis indicates that South Africa’s 
imposition of civil penalties is not unique to that country. All the 
countries discussed above provide for civil penalties when there 
are violations of their respective business and consumer 
protection acts. In comparing all of the examined nations, 
Australia is the only country, other than South Africa, that 
empowers courts to impose a penalty for ten percent of annual 
turnover against a violating franchisor. Such a steep civil penalty 
is not seen in United States, Chinese, or French law. Moreover, 
although Australia does allow for a stiff annual turnover penalty, 
it does not allow for criminal liability, a result that is different 
from the other four countries. South Africa, on the other hand, 
allows for stiff annual turnover penalties and criminal liability—
making South Africa’s laws the most stringent of all five 
countries compared. Notwithstanding the imposition of less 
extensive civil penalties, franchising appears to still be thriving 
in the United States, France, and China. China, for example, 
                                                                                                                                     
226. Id. 
227. See Robert W. Emerson, Fortune Favors the Franchisor: Survey and Analysis of the 
Franchisee’s Decision Whether to Hire Counsel, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); 
Robert W. Emerson, Franchisees in a Fringe Banking World: Striking the Balance Between 
Entrepreneurial Autonomy and Consumer Protection, 46 AKRON L. REV. 1 (2013); Robert W. 
Emerson & Uri Benoliel, Are Franchisees Well-Informed? Revisiting Debate Over Franchise 
Relationship Laws, 76 ALB. L. REV. 193 (2013); Robert W. Emerson & Uri Benoliel, Can 
Franchisee Associations Serve as a Substitute for Franchisee Protection Laws?, 118 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 99 (2013). 
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imposes civil penalties and, in some cases, public disgrace for 
franchisors that violate the country’s regulations but, 
nevertheless, franchising continues to grow in that country each 
year. 
In comparing the two countries that allow for an annual 
turnover penalty—Australia and South Africa—foreign franchise 
expansion may be affected. Australia’s large franchising sector is 
largely composed of Australian-based franchisors. This could be 
an indication that foreign franchisors are unwilling to take the 
risk—a result that may be harmful to Australia’s economy. On 
the other hand, it could just be a matter of distance and 
Australia’s geography. As for South Africa, the effect of the 
annual turnover penalty has yet to be seen. If, in the coming 
years, franchise expansion to South Africa slows, then the pro-
business approach of the United States and France may be a 
better model for attracting and retaining franchise investment. 
Across all five jurisdictions, unconscionable conduct or, 
alternatively, unfair business practices, are prohibited and 
discouraged. South Africa and Australia directly prohibit 
unconscionable conduct and, as stated above, will levy stiff civil 
penalties against violators. In the United States, unfair or 
deceptive trade practices are prohibited and the FTC, along with 
the courts, are empowered to ensure that parties are not 
engaging in such conduct. In contrast, France and China 
impose requirements of good faith and fairness between 
contracting parties and, accordingly, any conduct, practices, or 
tactics that fall short of those standards are prohibited. 
Moreover, in China, depending on the severity of the violation, 
the contract could be rendered unenforceable. Thus, in 
comparing all five countries, it is not likely that a prohibition of 
unconscionable conduct is likely to negatively impact future 
franchise growth in South Africa. 
In contrast, South Africa’s ten day cooling-off period is 
potentially harmful to franchise growth. In light of South 
Africa’s history of apartheid coupled with the country’s still very 
high illiteracy rates, it is understandable that a post-signing, 
cooling-off period would be desirable to the legislature to 
protect South African consumers, including franchisees. 
However, the only other two countries in this analysis that 
require a compulsory cooling-off period are Australia and 
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China. Australia’s cooling-off period is most analogous to South 
Africa’s because it fixes a specific time period (i.e., seven days) 
for franchisees to cancel a contract without penalty. Although 
franchise growth in Australia slowed following the adoption of 
this provision, the country has seen exceptional franchise 
growth in more recent years. Foreign franchisors, however, still 
compose a very small percentage of Australia’s franchise market. 
In contrast, China has also seen rapid franchise growth 
notwithstanding their imposition of a compulsory cooling-off 
period. The difference between China’s cooling-off period 
compared to that of South Africa and Australia is that China’s 
cooling-off period can be agreed upon by the franchisor and 
franchisee and, presumably, could be as short as a day or even 
less under the current regulations. China’s cooling-off period, 
therefore, is not much of a bar to foreign franchise investment 
in the country. Not surprisingly, the majority of the franchises in 
China are foreign-based. 
Neither the United States nor France require a cooling-off 
period. Both countries, however, recognize that a franchisee 
must be provided with certain disclosures before signing the 
agreement and require that those disclosures be provided to the 
franchisee on or before a specific amount of days prior to the 
signing of the agreement. However, once agreement is signed—
assuming there was no fraud or prohibited business practices—
the agreement becomes enforceable against the franchisee. In 
evaluating the approach of the United States and France, it 
becomes clear that the lack of a cooling-off period may be 
beneficial to franchise growth in the countries. The United 
States, for example, has seen large franchisee growth from both 
domestic and foreign franchisors. Similarly, France remains the 
largest franchise market in Europe. Accordingly, South Africa 
may be better served by following the pro-business approach of 
both the United States and France and eliminating the country’s 
compulsory cooling off period. 
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